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Abstract
We contribute  to  the  IPE literature  on  social  reproduction  and the  International  Political
Economy  of  the  everyday.  We  focus  on  how  the  global  economy  rests  on  domestic
foundations not just including state institutions but micro-social structures such as households
and families. To do so, we employ data from the UK Millennium Cohort Study exploring the
way different types of household (using proxies for social class) parent - as one aspect of
their  social  reproduction  strategies.   We argue  that  under  conditions  of  increased  global
competitiveness, the UK state has successfully embedded a politics of competitiveness at the
household  scale.   Households  of  all  types  are  aspirational for  their  children  and  invest
parental  time  in  helping  their  children  with  educational  activities.   However,  parents  in
middle  class  occupations,  with  higher  levels  of  qualifications  and  higher  income  have
advantageous informational,  cultural  and financial  resources and use these in a variety of
ways to support their social reproduction strategies.  The result is that agential responses to
competitiveness  result  in  ‘compound  inequalities’.  We  theorise  this  by  demonstrating
variegation across different household social reproduction strategies and show the embodying
the violence of social reproduction, even where there is no violent intent.  We speculate that
compound inequality may be causing a breakdown in the stable reproduction of society.
Key Words:
Social  Reproduction,  Class,  Inequality,  Social  Mobility,  Bourdieu,  Capitals,  Assets
Resources, Inter-generational, Parenting.
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Introduction: Global Pressures, Household Social Reproduction
Strategies and Compound Inequality
This  paper  contributes  to  an  understanding  of  the  multi-scalar  processes  of  Social
Reproduction  (SR),  empirically  documenting  the  way that  concerns  with competitiveness
have  shaped  parenting  practices,  which  are  a  crucial  process  in  the  reproduction  of  the
domestic and global political economy.  The paper uses data from the Millennium Cohort
Study (MCS) to develop an understanding of how parenting practices have influenced the
lives of young people born in the UK during the year 2000.  This is novel in unpacking the
detailed everyday practices of SR and, methodologically, in the use of data that is usually
ignored  in  IPE.   We  also  use  the  data  to  show  how  everyday  micro-practices  reshape
structural  aspects  of  the  political  economy;  in  this  case  illustrating  the  way  that
competitiveness and extant inequalities shape behaviours which in-turn lead to ‘compound
inequalities’.
We  situate  parenting  practices  as  one  component  of  Household  Social  Reproduction
Strategies  (HSRS).  There  is  now  a  burgeoning  literature  on  SR  building  on  a  feminist
tradition  (e.g.  Federici,  2012;  Mies,  2014;  Vogel,  2014). While  there  are  different
understandings  of  how  SR  relates  to  capitalism,  and  the  boundaries  between
productive/reproductive work in particular  (Mezzadri,  2021),  there is  broad agreement  on
what SR involves: the biological, cultural and economic reproduction of society including the
“…carework necessary for biological reproduction, the reproduction of human labor (and – in
large  part  –  the social  and cultural  values  of  specific  societies).”  (Steans  & Tepe,  2010,
p.809).
Bakker (2003) and Gill’s (Bakker & Gill, 2008) work on SR emphasises the link between
global economic processes and SR as a single totality, rather than distinct spheres of social
inquiry.  Similarly, Fraser stresses the reproduction of the ‘institutionalised social order’ and
Jaeggi  the  reproduction  of  the  ‘form  of  life’  (Fraser  &  Jaeggi,  2018).   Regardless  of
terminology, the intention is to explore linkages between, through and across different scales
of human social activity to identify the relations between systemic pressures at the scale of
the global economy and the temporal frame and spatial scale of everyday life.  Borrowing
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from Peck, Theodore and Brenner (e.g. Brenner et al., 2010), Bakker and Gill have recently
(2019) argued that SR is ‘variegated’ in that global pressures are experienced in different
ways and elicit different responses at different times and places.  Here, common pressures to
be competitive at the scale of the world market are translated through a “historically specific,
unevenly  developed,  hybrid,  patterned,  tendency  of  market-disciplinary  regulatory
restructuring” (Peck et al., 2012, p169). 
Peterson (2004, 2020) and Elias and Rai (2019) have added clarity to the idea, developing
separate  but  overlapping frameworks to understand how global  pressures are experienced
across space and time, and at very micro-scales.  The latter develop a framework of ‘Space,
Time and Violence’ to 
“…emphasise the co-constitutiveness of social reproduction and the everyday. …
important to rethink core IPE concepts such as production, the market, and labour
… the ways in which the work of social reproduction plays out temporally, spatially,
and in the context of gendered structural violence”.  
Their emphasis on the ‘everyday’ is part of a literature (Davies, 2016; Elias & Roberts, 2016;
Seabrooke, 2010; Seabrooke & Hobson, 2006; Stanley et al., 2016)1 on the political economy
of the everyday which showcases how global pressures are experienced and reproduced in the
often mundane practices and rhythms of everyday life (Mezzadri et al, 2021:2), and more
broadly  part  of  a  wider  research  in  IPE  on  scale  and  space  (Charnock,  2010a,  2010b;
Macartney & Shields, 2011), borrowing from pioneering work in geography (e.g. Marston,
2000; Smith, 1992).
Earlier  work on the  everyday (Braudel  & Reynold,  1992) stressed not  just  the top-down
aspects in which global pressures shape everyday life, but also the everyday practices that
lead  to  accretions  that,  as  they  are  repeated,  contribute  to  the  establishment  of  social
structures within broader temporal frames (e.g. in the epochal or longue-durée temporalities)
and spatial scales (Bakker, 2007, p543).  While Braudel treats the everyday as a temporal
frame, others have used it as a spatiotemporal scale and emphasised scalar-relational linkages
such that macro-scale global pressures force adaptation at lower scales.  However, in turn, the
most micro-scales of SR reproduce economic structures in contested forms through (more or
less conscious) adaptation, subversion and contestation (Marston, 2000; Mitchell et al. 2001).
1 Also See IPEEL.org 
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Peterson’s (2020) recent contributions show how broad-scale/long-term structures are at least
partly constructed in the intimate practices and relations of the family. 
This paper contributes to this literature illustrating the co-constitutive and co-evolutionary
nature of social phenomena at the largest temporal/spatial scales and the most micro.  Its aim
is to elaborate empirically some of the ways in which household scale-everyday processes are
influenced by the global pressures of competitiveness at the scale of the world market, passed
through the institutional structure of state policy and political rhetoric.  We also show how
household responses to these pressures might add to them, contributing to the development of
social structures, such as increased inequality.  We utilise the concept of HSRS, which are
“the more or less consciously developed day-to-day and inter-generational responses to the
social conditions that households confront and their own motivations and aspirations for the
future” (Authors, 2019).  The concept focuses on how everyday structures and agency adapt
to global  pressures,  but also on how they contest  and reimagine  them through their  own
motivations  and  aspirations.   Furthermore,  it  elaborates  the  abstract  idea  of  variegation
because  households  are  able  to  mobilise  very  different  resources  (financial,  relational,
informational  and cultural)  as they confront global  pressures and strive toward their  own
goals and values.   One potential  outcome of this  is  the reproduction and accentuation of
structural conditions. For example, in conditions of inequality and increased competitiveness,
the different  resources  that  households are  able  to  use in  their  HSRS might  ‘compound’
broader inequalities.
We explore these linkages across space and time through an empirical exploration of one
aspect of this process in the spatial frame of the UK.  The analysis which follows is novel in
several respects.  It draws on six sweeps of the MCS to explore how parenting has operated
across the lives of a cohort of young people who are now entering the labour market.  A focus
on families and parenting inside the household is relatively unusual in IPE anyway, but even
where this is referenced, there is very little work using quantitative empirical data from the
suite of cohort studies available in the UK (or indeed, elsewhere). Most work on the everyday
is  abstract  and  theoretical  or,  if  empirically  informed,  uses  ethnographic  or  qualitative
methods.  Our approach is significant  because it  extends our understanding of how global
economic trends can be explored through detailed empirical research at the household scale.  
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The next section outlines the secondary and primary data we use and our analytical strategies.
The findings section then utilises different sources of data to unpick – empirically - the steps
in  our  argument.  First,  we show that  the  UK social  ensemble  is  under  increased  global
pressures of competitiveness arising from world market integration. Second, we assert that
this has resulted in policies, political rhetoric and institutional reform that have sought to pass
the pressure of competitiveness down to the household and individual scale, in an attempt to
increase  the  economic  competitiveness  of  the  social  ensemble  as  a  whole.    Third,  we
investigate how households have adjusted to this through parenting aspects of their HSRS,
using the MCS data.  Analysis of this data highlights three themes. First, different types of
households (using various proxies for social class) are very similar in their parenting values
and behaviours.  Importantly, the data dispels any sense that working class, poorer or less
educated  parents  lack  aspiration  for  their  children.   While  this  is  repeatedly  shown  in
sociological research, it remains a rhetorical device in state scale attempts to pass down the
pressure of competitiveness.  Second, the data reveals an important counterveiling trend; the
different financial, informational and cultural resources that households use to pursue their
HSRS.  Third,  we find  very  little  difference  in  parenting  by  ethnicity,  indicating  a  trend
toward homogeneity in HSRS, at least in relation to education and skills. In the discussion
section  we  suggest  that  the  result  of  this  homogenisation  and  difference  might  be  the
simultaneous generation of ‘compound inequality’ and political polarisation, extending Elias
and Rai’s notion that social reproduction involves structural violence.
Methods and Data
Each section below draws on diverse data sources to substantiate the sequential steps in the
overall argument, but our main novel findings are based on data from the MCS. IPE readers
may be unfamiliar  with the UK’s main ‘cohort studies’ and their potential for use in IPE
research.  There are four main cohort studies covering generations born in 1958, 1970, 1998
and 2000 respectively. Here we draw on the MCS which is a UK wide cohort study following
the lives of more than 18,000 children born in 2000-1.  There have been 7 waves of the MCS
covering exceptionally detailed aspects of the cohort members’ lives. In early childhood they
comprise  medical  data,  teacher  and  school  surveys/interviews,  parental  interviews  and
sometimes  test  data.   More  recent  sweeps  often  include  time-use  and  even  technology
enhanced  data  on  physical  activity.   They sometimes  cover  very intimate  aspects  of  the
cohort members’ health, well-being and social life.  While always subject to the constraints of
quantitative  data,  they  nevertheless  offer  very  detailed  insights  into  the  lives  of  a
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representative (with weighting) sample of different UK generations. To our knowledge few
papers draw on this data in IPE.  
We draw on data from sweep 2 (age 3) to sweep 6 (age 14). We use this to create independent
variables related to class and ethnicity, and dependent variables related to parenting as one
component of HSRS. To construct our independent variables (see Table 1 for distributions in
the sample) we use three proxies for class position, recognising the political (Tyler, 2015) and
analytical problems associated with any particular operationalisation of the concept. First, we
use  the  most  recent  NS-SEC classification  (5  class  version),  using  the  highest  of  either
parents’ occupational class on the NS-SEC recorded at any sweep from 1-6 when the cohort
members  were  aged  14.   We  undertake  a  similar  process  to  create  a  'highest  parental
qualification' variable as a second proxy for class identity.  We also utilise the OECD income
quintiles from the MCS Sweep 6 Derived Variables dataset.  The data in the MCS also allows
exploration along a number of other important intersections with class such as gender and
ethnicity.  We also report a very brief account of differences in parenting by Cohort Member
ethnicity. 
We do not address the gendered question of who specifically does the work associated with
HSRS, for three main reasons.  First, this is already the subject of extensive research which
shows that domestic, caring and parenting work is disproportionately undertaken by women
and that it is ‘depleting’ (Authors, 2020; Folbre and Yoon, 2007; Rai and Goldblatt, 2020).
Second, MCS data is not as well suited to this task as some other data sources. The main
focus is  on the cohort  –  at  this  stage children,  rather  than the adults  involved.  The data
includes  interviews  with  a  ‘MAIN’  respondent  who  is  a  parent  or  carer  for  the  Cohort
Member as well as a ‘PARTNER’.  We use the MAIN respondent data, which, echoing the
point above, is usually the Cohort Member’s mother.  For example, at Sweep 1 the MAIN
respondent identified as female in 99.8% of cases and the natural parent in 96.4% of cases.
As  such,  the  vast  majority  of  the  work  in  parenting  we  report  below  is  done  by
women/mothers.  Third,  as  above,  constraints  of  space  mean  that  other  lines  of  analysis
requiring different analytical strategies will be dealt with in subsequent papers.
Another important issue revolves around the meaning of the household.  ‘Households’ are
tricky to pin down as an analytical unit precisely because they can look very different, can
comprise  multiple  families  or  stretch across  different  spaces  and can have  very different
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internal memberships. For the MCS, a household revolves around those people living with
the Cohort Member, and the dataset includes basic information on all other siblings, children
and other adults who live in the household, but the majority of the variables relate to the
Cohort Member themselves.  So in this sense, ‘the household’ in the analysis is the place that
the Cohort Member lives (including if they are at boarding school or live part of the time with
another  carer/parent).   While  always  problematic,  this  de-facto  (rather  than  theoretical)
definition of the household is sufficient to substantiate the arguments we make below about
agency, strategy, resources and outcomes (e.g. compound inequality).
INSERT Table 1 ABOUT HERE.
Box 1: Selection and construction of the composite variables
We created a series of variables (ParEdAtt) that focus on parental attitudes to education – which
act as a proxy for the frequently discussed concept of parental aspiration.  At age 3 this focusses on
the importance of ‘doing well at school’, at age 7-14 this focusses on whether parents want children
to ‘stay on’ at school and how likely they think it is that their child will attend university, with the
age 14 measure having more answer options. These survey items express attitudes to education,
aspiration and confidence in those aspirations.
We created a series of dummy variables that aggregate the various ways in which parents invest
time in their children, though obviously, the activities that feed into this differ across the different
ages; singing, practising the alphabet at age 3, whereas at age 7 through 14 this also included help
with homework.  Where relevant, the aggregation separated investment of time in homework or
educational  development  (ParInvTime3Rs)  from  broader  aspects  of  spending  time  doing
recreational  activities,  which  are  nevertheless  widely  associated  with  cognitive  and  social
development  (ParInvTime),  and  might  therefore  be  associated  with  processes  of  ‘concerted
cultivation’. 
A further way in which parenting may affect child outcomes, and which might vary for different
types of family or household, is concerns how  parents interact with institutions, particularly
schools (ParSchool).  Throughout all the age groups the variables focussed on attending parents'
evenings and parent-initiated special school meetings to ensure that the emphasis was on parents
engaging  schools  rather  than  the  other  way  around.   At  different  ages  these  measures  were
broadened with additional items focussed on educational reasons for school choice (age 5); active
investment of time in school-based activities such as helping in the classroom (age 7); and steps
taken to get into the desired secondary school (age 11). Variables derived from the use of financial
resources to engage with schools are dealt with separately.
There is concern that one of the mechanisms that underpin the reproduction of inequality is extra
tuition outside of school (Jerrim, 2017). At age 11 and 14 MCS asked parents about additional
classes in English, Maths and Science and we aggregated these into two measures of receiving
extra classes (Tuition) and whether these were paid for (PayTuition).  
There are a variety of other ways in which families can seek to use financial resources to advantage
their children.  The most obvious is by  paying for private schooling.  The MCS has questions
about school fees at most sweeps and we used these as a binary at ages 5, 7 and 14 (SchFees).
However, there are also more subtle ways in which this is manifest such as being able to purchase
a house in a particular school’s catchment area, a factor widely held to inflate property prices in
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particular areas.  We also used a computed measure of using financial resources to influence school
admissions at the transition to secondary school (age 11) which aggregated variables for moving
house, renting or paying for extra tuition for entrance exams specifically (FinResSch). 
A large part of what Lareau (2011) described as ‘concerted cultivation’ revolved around organised
extra-curricular activities.  There are some variables  in  MCS that  we can use to judge these,
especially at age 11, aggregated from survey items about the frequency of visiting the library or
learning a musical instrument, and age 14 aggregated from items about a range of activities outside
of school (going to the cinema, going to watch live sport, sing in a choir or play in an orchestra,
reading for pleasure, visiting heritage sites, religious services or engaging with organised clubs or
societies or engaging in vigorous physical activity).  We also included a counter-veiling ‘screen
time’  measure  at  age 14,  though some previous research has  noted that  watching TV may be
correlated with faster cognitive development in early years at least (Sullivan et al., 2013).
To develop an understanding of intergenerational HSRS, we created dependent variables (see
Table 2 and Box 1) to represent six different aspects of parenting behaviour highlighted in the
literature on parenting as related to the development of ‘Capitals,  Assets and Resources’,
including (1) parental values, attitudes and aspirations; (2) investment of time in helping with
school  work  and  wider  activities  associated  with  cognitive  development;  (3)  parental
interaction  with  educational  institutions  (schools);  (4)  extra  tuition;  (5)  using  financial
resources to influence school selection; and (6) extra-curricular activities.  Wherever possible
we developed composite  variables  that  could be measured across multiple  sweeps of the
MCS.
We removed missing data/respondents.  This  has downsides in reducing the sample sizes,
potentially increasing response bias.  The positives are that we avoid the risks of imputing
values and since we are interested mainly in structural (in)variance between groups, the risks
to  representativeness  are  minimised.  For  the  most  part,  we  undertook  the  analysis
unweighted, but made checks to see the effects of weightings, using the individual sweep
weights from the longitudinal file and sweep 6 where we used cross sweep analysis.  No
changes to the patterns identified were identified.  We conducted a series of parametric tests
(one-way anovas)  using SPSS.  To assess  where the differences  are  located  between the
groups we conducted post-hoc tests  and employed the Bonferroni  correction to  minimise
potential  errors  from multiple  pairwise  testing  (Shaffer,  1995).   The  headline  results  are
described in the text, referring only to statistically significant differences.  We present only
summaries of the data aligned to key findings which show tests of the significance of the
variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent variable (eta).  Additional
data  summarising  the  means  comparisons  (and  significance)  are  in  tabular  form  in  the
appendix. 
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INSERT Table 2 HERE
Analysis
We make five sequential arguments and provide evidence to substantiate each in turn. The
first two are largely contextual, documenting the pressures experienced by UK households.
The latter three are more novel and derived from the MCS data and outline the similar and
different ways that HSRS have responded to those contextual pressures.
The UK State under the Global Pressure of World Market Integration
The institutional  architecture  for  governance  of  the  global  economy at  the  end of  WW2
focussed on world market integration and expansion, with huge success, especially since the
end of the Cold War.  Any number of indicators of the scale of this process are available,
including trade growth, the increased output and productivity in China and South East Asia
(Milanovic, 2019), the industrialisation of the so-called BRICs and the massive growth of the
global labour force at least partly engaged in wage labour, though that clearly understates the
intensification  of  world  market  integration  given the  significance  of  related  processes  of
resource and input extraction outside of wage labour (Harvey, 2003), the continued relevance
of informal work (ILO, 2020) and the transformation and rescaling of social reproduction
(Elias, 2020).
All this means that the global scale is increasingly ‘ecologically dominant’ over other scales
in  the social  ensemble  of  the  global  economy (Jessop,  2012).  Smaller  scales  of  political
organisation must increasingly cope with the ‘feedback effects’ of global integration (Jessop,
2015), with one of these being to ensure national competitiveness. Table 3 shows ten-year
aggregate averages (to iron out cyclical patterns between individual years) of shares of world
economic  output  overall  and  per-capita.   The  UK,  Europe  and  the  US have  captured  a
declining share of global output,  since the end of the Cold War.   Furthermore,  since the
Global Financial Crisis of 2008-, all three have experienced a declining ratio of output per-
capita relative to the world total.  In sum, the UK has experienced a declining competitive
position in the global economy as world market expansion has accelerated since 1990.
INSERT TABLE 3 about here.
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State Scale Responses to Global Pressures: Driving Competitiveness Deeper
One state-scale  response has been an increasing preoccupation  with recovering economic
competitiveness  (Coates,  2000).   There  is  no  shortage  of  national  and  macro-regional
strategies  that  exhibit  this,  such  as  attempts  by  international  organisations  to  promote
competitiveness among their member states (Cammack, 2001, 2021) or the various iterations
of competitiveness strategies as part of the EU’s  Lisbon and then  Europe 2020 Strategies.
Successive UK governments have been no exception to this trend.  
Of course, state scale policy responses are widely cast; covering skills and technology, fiscal
policy, the designation of deregulated spatial zones, transport policy and investment and so
on.  Responding  to  the  idea  that  Thatcherism  had  created  a  low-value  added  economy
(Gamble 1990:214), the New Labour government targeted workforce skills and education
from  the  outset  (Author,  2006;  2007;  2008;  2009).   A  government  report  succinctly
summarises the issue:
“British business can no longer compete on the basis of low cost, low value added
activity. To be successful, it is even more important for business and individuals to
learn  new  skills,  be  more  creative  and  innovative  and  use  their  knowledge  to
produce higher value added goods and services”  (DFEE and DTI, 2001).
The evolving policy agenda has involved academisation of secondary schools, the extension
of compulsory schooling at both ends of the age spectrum, increased enrolments in higher
levels  of  education,  endless  reform  of  technical  post-compulsory  education  and
apprenticeships, apprenticeship levies on employers and introduction and successive reforms
of the ‘national curriculum’ and assessment processes (Authors, xxxx).  As we write this
paper,  HE is  again  in  the  government’s  sights  with  another  round  of  pressure  to  focus
enrolments  in  subjects  that  can  apparently  better  support  competitiveness  (Gove,  2020).
Schools have faced pressure directly and mediated  via OFSTED inspection judgements, to
engage parents more in support of their childrens’ education and to be clear with children and
young people about individualised targets for progression and attainment which are regularly
and repeatedly communicated, revised and assessed.  Teachers have become familiar with
regular data analysis on pupil progress and few parents will be unfamiliar with how many
‘points progress’ their children were expected to have made and their achievements in this
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regard.  Examination points such as A-Level (age 18), GCSE (the end of secondary school at
age 16) and ‘Standard Assessment Tests’ or SATs (end of primary school) have become the
subject  of  a  great  deal  of  pressure on  young people  to  achieve,  with  the  former  two in
particular  linked  to  gateways  to  Further  and  Higher  Education  pathways  which  largely
control access to career opportunities.  The pressure around these key education gateways and
the risks/rewards associated with them is massively exacerbated as a result of the decades of
labour market reform, increased insecurity and welfare retrenchment (Edmiston, 2017). 
Successive governments  have also lamented a lack of willingness or ability  among some
sections of society to engage in the process.  ‘Aspiration’ is frequently mentioned as a barrier
to  educational  performance and therefore also of economic performance (Authors,  xxxx).
This is both a rhetorical initiative and an institutional one.  Many researchers have of course
successfully challenged the idea of an ‘aspiration’ problem (Ermisch, 2008; Sullivan et al.,
2013), but it remains an important part of the ongoing ‘social mobility’ agenda and it is well
embedded in the minds of practitioners. 
The reality of course, is that neither educational performance nor aspiration will change the
structural opportunities available nor the creeping casualisation and insecurity of previously
secure and well-paid occupational roles.  Prominent social mobility theorists now anticipate
that  the  growth  of  Professional/Managerial  occupations  may  be  slowing  (Bukodi  &
Goldthorpe,  2018),  and  recent  research  illustrates  the  resulting  downward  patterns  of
intergenerational mobility (Social Mobility Commission, 2020).  This is relevant to the wider
political significance of our empirical findings, discussed in the final section.  Now, we move
to show not just that the state has attempted to push down competitiveness to the individual
and household scale, but that this has been largely successful.
Competitiveness in Household Social Reproduction Strategies
One measure  of  household  strategising  for  competitiveness  is  their  values  in  relation  to
education (our variables on this are labelled ‘ParEdAtt’). For the NS-SEC class proxy, mean
answers vary very little across these variables, especially between age 3 and 11 where the
range is small and variances are mostly not statistically significant or show mixed patterns.
There is little difference in the mean scores of attitudes to education by parental NS-SEC
class when the cohort members were aged 3, 7 and at age 11 Professional and Managerial
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parents  had  statistically  significantly  lower  positive  values  on the  aggregated  variable  of
wanting their children to stay on at school and thinking it likely their children would go to
University. A very similar pattern was observed in relation to the educational proxy for class,
with a slightly larger negative gap with the least educated parents.  Likewise, virtually exactly
the same pattern was observed for income groups, with the most well paid having lower
positive scores on these variables at age 11 than other income groups, but no statistically
significant patterns at earlier ages.  
In sum, the data on these educational attitudes and values variables  shows no discernible
pattern of variation by three separate proxies for social class, until age 11 when it appears that
‘working class’ parents have stronger positive values about education than do ‘middle class’
parents. 
INSERT Table 4 ABOUT HERE
A  second  way  to  think  about  how  households  internalise  competitiveness  might  be  in
investing  their  time  in  helping  children  with  school  work  or  directly  related  tasks  like
reading,  writing  or  maths  at  age  5,  7,  11  and  14  (ParInvTime3Rs).   There  were  some
statistically  significant  differences  in  parental  investment  of  time  in  helping  with  school
work, but no clear pattern in terms of the NS-SEC proxy in early childhood.  For instance, at
age  5,  Professional/Managerial  parents  spent  less  time  than  all  other  groups,  but  this
difference was significant only compared with lower supervisory and technical parents.  At
age 7 there were no statistically significant differences.  The patterns were similar in terms of
parental education; no clear statistically significant patterns at age 5, 7 or 11.  There were
differences in parental investment of time helping with school/educational work according to
income groups however at age 5, though not at age 7, indicating mixed findings, at least at
earlier ages (see below).
What the data suggests is that there are very few differences in parental aspirations for their
children in relation to education and that working class and lower educated parents are just
as, or more likely, to spend time helping their children with school work, especially at early
ages.  This questions the idea that working class, lower income or lower educated parents
lack  aspiration  for  their  children  or  fail  to  help  them  engage  with  education.   It  rather
suggests that the state scale message about education has filtered through to all households. 
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Class Based Differences in Resources to Pursue HSRS
This is not to say that class differences in HSRS are unimportant.  There remain important
differences in the extent to which different households can utilise informational, cultural and
financial resources in support of their HSRS. 
First, while our aggregate variable for testing parental attitudes to education (ParEdAtt) did
not show class-based variation up to age 11, at age 14 there were clear variations. Part of this
was caused by the difference in the measure at that age 14 where there is greater scope for
variation because of the larger range of answer options on the survey and because it includes
a ‘likelihood’ or confidence measure in those aspirations.  At age 14, class-based differences
are present.   On the NS-SEC proxy the mean scores on this  variable  range from 4.3 for
Professional and Managerial parents to 3.8 for Semi-Routine/Routine parents with a linear
pattern (in that the mean increased for each of the class groups from Routine through to
Professional/Managerial) through the class groups which is statistically significant. Similar
and  significant  linear  patterns  were  also  apparent  concerning  parental  qualifications  and
income  group  quintiles  at  age  14.  The  largest  differences  were  related  to  parental
qualifications, with a 25% difference in the mean score.  Like earlier research (Lupton &
Kintrea,  2011,  Irwin,  2018)  we  can  conclude  that  parental  aspirations  about  children’s
education are not greatly affected by class, income (or indeed ethnicity), but confidence in
those aspirations does vary as children get closer to the end of compulsory schooling.
Differences along class lines were also apparent in the investment of time on educational
activities (ParInvTime3rs) at age 14, as opposed to at earlier  ages.  At age 14 there were
small  but  statistically  significant  differences  between  Professional  and  Managerial  and
Intermediate class parents and the rest with the former having slightly higher scores, with
similar patterns reported for higher income groups.  
INSERT TABLE 5 about here.
There were also differences in the time parents spend on wider  - not directly school-related –
activities (ParInvTime).  These were broadly linear (i.e. were progressively larger through the
class hierarchy) and statistically significant on the NS-SEC proxy for class.  Very similar
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patterns emerge using the highest parental qualification proxy for class.  There are linear and
significant  patterns  through  the  qualification  distribution  at  age  3  and  in  the  general
investment  of  time  at  age  7.  Comparison  by  income  group  reveals  similar  significant
differences in the investment of time generally between ages 3 to 14, with broadly linear and
positive differences in mean values as income rises.  
A similar measure relates to participation in organised extra-curricular activities.  Children of
Managers  and  Professionals  spend  significantly  more  time  on  organised  or  concerted
extracurricular activities at age 11 and 14 and less time on TV/Videos/internet and social
media. Using the education proxy shows a broadly linear pattern of variation. Children of
Managers and Professionals had an 8% higher mean at age 11 and 12% higher mean at age
14 for  organised/concerted  activities  and a  7% lower  screen  time score.   The  difference
between top and bottom of the scale on the educational qualification proxy was larger still
being 20, 18 and -10% for concerted extra-curricular activities at age 11, 14 and screen time
respectively.  Using the statistical test, class proxies explain between 0.5-5% of the variance.
Similar  patterns of variation are present across income groups and again like educational
qualifications, differences are broadly aligned to income quintiles, with income explaining
between 0.4 and 4% of the variation.  
There were further differences in our measures of parent-school engagement ((ParSchool)
which could itself be taken as a proxy for institutional manipulation) for all proxy measures
of class with these explaining up to 5% of the difference between groups.  Managers and
Professionals and those with NVQL5 showed greater engagement with schools throughout
the age ranges and differences between the top and bottom of the scales ranged from 8% to
over half.  Differences by income group were even starker, ranging from 9 to 70% in the
mean score between the top and bottom of the distribution. In the statistical tests, income
explained 8% of this variation.  The gaps on all these scores were much larger for the age 7
measure  where the variable  we used had a  larger  number of more  nuanced components,
including  not  just  engagement  with  school  choice  and  parent  evenings  but  more  active
measures such as helping out in school.
INSERT TABLE 6 about here.
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We  investigated  whether  households  organise  additional  tuition  for  their  children
(ExtraTuition) and whether they pay for this (PayTuition).  Weighted for the UK population
at  the relevant  sweep,  about  20% of  households  reported  that  cohort  members  had extra
tuition at age 11 and about 11% at age 14.  There were small but non-linear differences across
class groups using NS-SEC.  Managers and Professionals and Self-Employed parents were
significantly more likely to have extra lessons for their children at both sweeps.  Where they
have  extra  lessons,  Managers  and  Professional  parents  were  more  likely  than  lower
supervisory or Semi/Routine workers to pay for those lessons.  Linear patterns are present in
the parental qualification proxy, with those with parental qualifications at NVQ Level 4 and 5
being significantly more likely to have extra lessons and to pay for them. On both proxies,
class is an important predictor of variation in paying for lessons – accounting for between 6-
10% of the variation.   While income groups only explain a small  part of the variation in
having extra lessons, they explain roughly 10% of the variation in paying for them.  
INSERT TABLE 7 about here.
We also found similar patterns for using financial resources for other forms of educational
advantage such as paying school fees for private  schooling (SchFees) and using financial
resources to influence state school entry by living close to a desirable school or paying for
tuition specifically to pass a selective school entrance exam (FinResSch).  Around 6% of the
sample report paying school fees in sweep 6 – at other points in time the figure is lower.  For
the most part, children of Managerial/Professional parents were significantly more likely than
the rest to use financial resources for school fees or to influence which secondary school their
child goes to. For example, Professional/Managerial parents had a mean score on the measure
for using financial resources to influence school of more than 150% that of Semi/Routine or
Lower Supervisory parents.  While paying school fees is marginal for all groups, it is several
times  more  likely  for  Professional/Managerial,  the  highest  qualified  parents  or  highest
income groups relative to Semi/Routine, the lowest qualified and lowest earners.  For income,
the differences between groups increase through the income distribution and are statistically
significant across all variables. 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE.
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One  interpretation  of  the  differences  that  are  clearly  present  in  class-based  patterns  of
parenting in HSRS is to suggest that they arise out of informational, cultural and financial
resources.  ‘Middle class’ parents do not spend more time helping with school work, but they
do  intervene  more  at  critical phases  in  their  children’s  lives  (e.g.  at  the  point  at  which
children are taking exams which set them on institutionally unequal educational pathways).
They engage with schools more, especially beyond merely attending parents’ evenings.  They
are  also  more  likely  to  spend time  on non-school  activities  and to  ensure  their  children
participate in out of school organised activities.  They are more likely to use their additional
financial  resources to pay for extra tuition and to use financial  resources to effect school
selection and, unsurprisingly, pay private school fees.  If the logic and motivation to compete
is broadly homogenous, the ability to use resources of all types to do so, is not.
Differences in Parenting by ethnicity
Shilliam  (2009)  has  argued  persuasively  that  racial  categories  have  historically  served
purposes similar to those of ‘class’ in demarcating certain individuals and communities for
differential economic positions, often with extreme and violent consequences.  He also argues
that race and class intersect prominently in contemporary debates in British politics (2018:
Ch7) about identity and who is regarded as ‘deserving’ of economic position or state support.
Our data allows a very partial glimpse at these issues from the perspective of parenting. 
The findings are to some extent revealing in their banality.  They show some variation in
parenting by cohort member ethnicity but no clear trajectory.  For example, that there was no
clear  pattern  in  terms  of  ethnicity  for  parental  attitudes  to  education  across  sweeps  2-6.
However, at age 14 when the variable has a wider range there is a significantly more positive
attitude to education among all non-white ethnicities, compared to white cohort members,
with Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi and Black cohort members having parents with the
strongest positive attitudes to education.  Comparison of parental investment of time reveals
significant differences in the investment of time at ages 3 to 11 with White, Mixed ethnicity
and  Indian  children  receiving  more  general  time  investments  from  parents.  Significant
variation in time investments largely disappear however for schoolwork.  
Small differences were present in parental engagement with schools. In the more fine-grained
age-7 measure, parents of White and Mixed ethnicity children engaged significantly more
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with schools than other parents. Parents of Pakistani and Bangladeshi children had the lowest
scores for engaging with schools. This didn’t add up to a picture of disinterest  in school
among  parents  of  Black  and Minority  Ethnic  children;  far  from it.   Black/Black  British
children were significantly more likely than other ethnic groups to receive additional out of
school tuition both at age 11 and 14.  White children and dual heritage children were less
likely to have additional tuition.   These differences did not carry through into paying for
lessons however, where there were no clear or consistent differences, save for Indian children
being more likely than some other groups to pay for lessons.  There were no clear differences
in relation to paying private school fees, except for Indian cohort members whose parents
were more likely to pay for private  school or use financial  resources to influence school
choice. Nearly all non-White ethnicities were statistically more likely to be active in extra-
curricular activity than are White young people at both age 11 and 14.
The data clearly needs unpacking in more detail for meaningful messages to emerge from it,
with intersections  of class and gender clearly being important  to unpick.  We suspect  the
former will help to explain some of the variations highlighted above.  The initial conclusion
to be drawn from it though is that ethnicity has no main influence on parenting in the sense of
reproducing class position.  There are hints that some ethnic minority groups may find it
harder to engage with institutions, despite having similar positive values toward education.
The other non-finding here is a relative lack of support for any sense of ‘left behind’ White
working  class  communities  in  terms  of  parenting.   As  with  class,  all  parents  appear
aspirational for their children’s future.
Discussion
The preceding discussion adds to studies (Ermisch, 2008; Irwin, 2018; Lareau, 2011; Sullivan
et al., 2013) that open up the ‘black box’ of the household to show how different HSRS might
add up to the reproduction of inequalities between generations. In relation to IPE, we draw
attention to four implications below. 
First, following  Elias  and  Rai  (2019,pp.214–215),  we  argue  that  violence  is  an  integral
element of everyday social reproduction.  They focus on the gendered depletion of mundane
household tasks, domestic violence, the structural violence of poverty and inequality and the
way  that  everyday  violence  is  used  to  regulate  public  spheres.   Our  data  extends  this
conceptualisation of everyday violence still further. We show that violent outcomes can result
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from benign intentions: households doing their best for their children.  We show that because
of extant inequality this act results in differential and unequal outcomes.  We think of this in
terms of ‘compound inequality’ in that it refers to the ways that agential responses to extant
structural conditions, reinforce and accentuate those structural conditions. 
Second, the discussion illustrates the long-running feminist  case that the formal economy
rests on a series of foundations in the domestic sphere (Elson, 1998) – the ‘back stories’
(Fraser  &  Jaeggi,  2018)  –  which  are  most  often  not  accounted  for  in  mainstream  or
‘orthodox’ economics or even some critical international political economy (Authors, xxxx).
As such we contribute to the plugging of gaps in research on the relational nature of scale that
do  not  fully  account  for  the  interaction  between  the  global  scale  of  production  and
competitiveness and the micro-scales of social reproduction (Marston, 2000),  A failure to
account for the significance of these factors is not merely an intellectual omission: it has very
practical consequences.  It may actually undermine efforts to pursue competitiveness for the
economy overall, albeit there are also significant risks in subsuming related issues such as the
gender  inequalities  of  HSRS  to  the  often  ambiguous  or  shifting  requirements  of
competitiveness (Elias, 2020). It also ignores the way that micro-scale processes add up to
macro-scale social problems such as compound inequalities.
Additionally the data speaks to a range of political economy issues and research problems.
The findings suggest that Bordieuan insights into class reproduction (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984)
have  a  political  economy  significance  that  exceeds  their  current  discussion  in  the  IPE
literature.  This is not so much as a replacement for more structural or Marxist ideas of class,
which is how they have tended to be discussed when they do feature (Radice, 2014) but how
individuals and social groups position themselves to advantage (or otherwise) within them.
The findings also call into question the utility – or violence – of such systems of classification
themselves.  
Finally, the link between HSRS and ‘compound inequality’ may be fuelling a popular sense
of injustice, with broader structurally violent and destabilising outcomes – a ‘new politics of
inequality’. This includes first a widespread recognition of inequalities and that this is driving
resentment but without serious prospect that their underlying causes will abate. Indeed, as we
speculate  above,  the  opposite  seems  likely,  creating  fertile  ground  for  further  political
destabilisation and disciplinary – structurally violent - responses (Authors, Forthcoming).
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Conclusion
Returning to the more direct contributions of this paper. First, we contribute empirically to
the now burgeoning literature exploring various aspects of social reproduction. We highlight
how parenting helps to reproduce inequalities over time, as one aspect of HSRS.  We suggest
that the relationship between extant inequality, household agency and future inequalities is
captured  in  the  concept  of  ‘compound  inequality’.   Theoretically  we  contribute  to  the
literature  on  social  reproduction  as  an  ‘everyday’  socio-economic  process  and  how  the
reproduction  of  the  overall  social  ensemble  which  is  variegated  across  space,  time  and
involves  the reproduction  of structural  violence.  This  itself  is  part  of  a  now increasingly
important literature which illustrates the domestic foundations of the global economy, and the
relational aspects of scale production that extend both capitalist imperatives and state power
into the scale of social reproduction (Marston, 2000).  Given that the data is largely derived
from  women/mothers  we  contribute  to  what  is  already  well  known  about  the  gendered
division of labour, but also that there is a strong intersection between gender and class in the
reproduction of the population and workforce over time, not so much in attitudes, aspirations
and effort, but in the informational, cultural and material resources that different parents can
draw on in the process.
Finally, we offer an insight into possible methodological departures for critical IPE: to make
more of the voluminous empirical data that is available in longitudinal and cohort studies.
This is not a replacement for, but in addition to, the more qualitative and ethnographic work
that is usually related to the investigation of the ‘everyday’ in IPE.  There are limitations to
the cohort study data; for instance in this case we cannot answer questions about why parents
hold particular values or adopt particular strategies.  To answer such questions quantitative
survey data needs to be complemented with qualitative exploration.  In future research, we
aim to extend our analysis addressing intersections between class, gender and ethnicity and to
add new qualitative data to understand these ‘why’ questions.
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